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lN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
,\I1Cl-L\EL l\IUKASEY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
YS. 
HOBERT S. AARON, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
11008 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEl\lENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover damages for personal 
;11jurics arising out of an automobile accident. 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
The Seventh Judicial District Court, at a pretrial 
hearing, granted summary judgment of no cause of 
:1dio:1 in fawir of the defendant and against the plain-
tiff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respoudent seeks affirmance of the Court's orutr 
of summary judgment granted herein. 
STATEl\lENT OF FACTS 
Since the record forwarded to this Court by the 
Clerk of the District Court does not have the pleading~ 
numbered by page, it will be necessary to refer to the 
pleading itself without reference to page numbers. 
The plaintiff and defendant were college studenb 
on summer vacation. Plaintiff resided in the State of 
New York, and defendant was a resident of New 
.T ersey. They desired to visit several cities in the western 
states and to seek employment as they traveled from 
city to city. They were primarily interested in working 
on oil rigs. (Ptf. Dep. pp. 7 & 8) In answer to a 
newspaper advertisement in a New York City nem· 
paper, the boys accompanied the owner of a vehicle 
to the State of Utah, assisting in driving the vehicle 
and in sharing the automobile expenses. After arriving, 
they obtained various jobs and stayed for several weeks 
in Utah and Colorado. (Ptf. Dep. pp. 8-13) There· 
after the defendant indicated that the manual labor 
' 
they were <loing was too strenuous for him and that he 
desired to quit his job. It was then agreed that they 
would go to California and while there visit with the 
defendant's brother. (Ptf. Dep. pp. J.6-47) The tll'r 
















the City of Denver. The following morning, they 
: ns\rered a ne\vspaper ad indicating that an automobile 
could be made available to drive to California if they 
,,ouid pay the expenses of driving the automobile. 
Hoth of them went to the owner of the automobile and , 
aftPr the plaintiff made inquiry as to whether or not 
J( wuul<l be permissible for the defendant to assist him 
in tlic Llriving, he thereafter signed a written contract 
with the owner of the automobile agreeing to transport 
lhe automobile to California and to pay all the operat-
iug expenses of the automobile. In addition thereto, 
the plaintiff was required to give a $25.00 deposit on 
lhe automobile to guarantee its safe delivery, where-
upon he was to receive a refund of the money. Plain-
tiff awl defendant both testified that it was understood 
licl ween them they would share in the expenses of 
upertaing the automobile, as well as the deposit on 
tl1e automobile, and that defendant \vould assist the 
plaintiff in driving. (Ptf. Dep. pp. 13-20; Def. Dep. 
pp. 9-12) 
They left Denver and drove to the State of Utah 
during the first day after receiving the automobile. A 
['cw miles south of Huntington, Utah, they drove tci 
'lK edge of the roadway to sleep in the car overnight. 
The following morning the defendant was the first to 
drire. (Ptf. Dep. pp. 21-23) The plaintiff was awake 
from the moment they started to drive until the accident 
oecurred. ( Ptf. Dep. p. 23) Neither of the parties 
11ne familiar with the highway. The weather was clear; 
d1(· d:1y \ms sunny and warm. Visibility was good. As 
3 
the defendant drove down the highway, he noticed tlw 
the highway cunred to the left. At this point, b1111 
plaintiff and defendant agreed that the car was morin1; 
«bout fifty-five miles per hour. The defendant 11 ,'. 
unable to negotiate the curve for some reason, anJ tli 
car left the highway, overturning. Plaintiff and <l1 
fendant "·ei·c both injured. ( Ptf. Dep. p. 23-30) 
Plaintiff testified that he was fully satisiied wit!, 
ih.? defendant's driving. The defendant obeyed all 
traffic rules and regulations, did not drive beyond the 
speed limit and at no time did he partake of intoxi 
eating beverages. (Ptf. Dep. p. 21-30) He did state. 
however, that immediately before the car left the high· 
way he commented to the defendant to slow down 111 
they were entering a curve. ( Ptf. Dep. p. 27 and J3! 
Plaintiff thereafter sued the defendant, the owner 
of the automobile and the driveaway company pro· 
viding the automobile, alleging that the defendan1 
Aaron was an agent or employee of the owner and 
driveaway company. lVIotions for summary judgmen! 
were filed by the owner of the vehicle, the driveaway 
company and defendant Aaron based upon the writteu 
contract signed by the plaintiff, which contained an 
agreement to hold harmless the owner, the driveaway 
company, ~nd any of its agents or employees for any 
injury to the plaintiff. Defendant Aaron, prior to the 
taking of the depositions, entered an Answer to the 
Amended Complaint, denying any acts of negligence 




i'ellses of contributory negligence, agency and joint 
'·en lure. 
The Court granted the motions for summary judg-
ment filed by the owner and the driveaway company, 
hut denied defendant Aaron's motion, based upon his 
1i~cading that the acts of plaintiff and this defendant 
!llight constitute a joint venture. Thereafter, defendant 
_\arm!, without objection from the plaintiff, was per-
1i1itted to abandon the defense of joint venture. 
The depositions of plaintiff and defendant \vere 
:aken in the City of New York by associate counsel. 
"·,i'ter reviewing the depositions, a motion for summary 
Judgment was again filed by defendant Aaron, claim-
illg that there was no joint venture as plaintiff now 
alleges, based upon the depositions of the parties, and 
that based upon plaintiff's own testimony there was 
110 evidence of willful misconduct. 
The motion was argued to The Honorable Henry 
Ruggeri, District Judge, and denied. The matter was 
then called on for pretrial some months later. At the 
time of pretrial, Judge Ruggeri indicated to counsel 
for the plaintiff that he would have granted defendant 
Jaron's second motion for summary judgment had 
it ;10t been for the fact that perhaps the plaintiff might 
Je\'elop further evidence to be considered at the time 
of pretrial that the Court was not aware of. The Court 
then thoroughly considered the issues claimed by the 
plaintiff, and heard the substance of the evidence that 
\1u11kl be produced at the time the case went to trial. 
5 
Thereafter, the Court ruled that there was uo eYidelll, 
of a joint Yenture as alleged by the plaintiff, nor wa1 
there any evidence of willful misconduct by the de 
fendant. 
Plaintiff contended that these were the two issues 
i1wolYed in the case. (Pretrial transcript p. 34 and 4u, 
It should also be noted that at the time of the pre· 
trial conference, upon motion of defendant Aaron and 
without objection of the plaintiff, the defense of agency 
or imputed negligence was abandoned by the defendant 
(Pretrial transcript p. 29) 
POINTS URGED FOR AFFIRMANCE 
POINT I 
SUl\11\lARY JUDG.MENT BY THE COURT 
YV/:..S PROPER AS THERE vV AS NO GENC· 
INE ISSUE OF FACT TO BE PRESENTED 
TO THE JURY. 
POINT II 
THE PRETRIAL .JUDGE CORRECTLY 
RULED THAT THE PARTIES vVERE NOT 









'l'HE PHETRIAL JUDGE 'VAS NOT PRE-
:,'L CDED FHO~I CONSIDERING THE 1\'.10-
i H).:\' FOll DIS.MISSAL AT THE TIME OF 
l'HETRIAL. 
POINT IV 
THERE \VAS NO ISSUE OF FACT AS TO 
1\'ILLFCL _MISCONDUCT ON THE PART 
·.iF 'i'IIE DEFENDANT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
Sl!l\ll\lARY JUDG1\1ENT BY THE COURT 
i1f.\S l'HOPER, AS THERE 'VAS NO GENU-
iNE ISSUE OF FACT TO BE PRESENTED 
TU THE JURY. 
The Court inquired of plaintiff's counsel whether 
or nut the plaintiff had any additional evidence other 
lhan the depositions of the plaintiff and defendant 
r dlHX:ming the facts as to how the accident happened 
()\ the arrangement of the plaintiff and the defendant 
iu the use of the automobile. Plaintiff's counsel re-
~pontlc<l that there was no additional evidence that 
r11tdd be presented at the time of trial and that the 
depositions ,vere in sum and substance the evidence 
'1111LTrning both the issue of joint venture and the issue 
1;! \\'illful misconduct. It was agreed that there were 
7 
only two issues to be resolved: 'Vas there a joint \'et: 
lure aud. or willful misconduct, excluding plaintiff frou
1 
the terms of the Guest Statute. 
\'iewi11g the evidence most favorable to the plai 11. 
tiff, as we must do, the testimony of the plaintiff \l'ai 
that he and the defendant were college students desiring 
to visit several cities in the western Unied States dur. 
iug their summer vacation from college. They shared 
in the expenses of transportation when the plaintitt 
arranged for an automobile to drive to California, Ji 
was agreed that defendant would assist him in the 
driving, together with sharing expenses of operation. 
After being informed by counsel for the plaintiff that 
there would not be any additional evidence, the Couri 
ruled that there was insufficient evidence to raise a jur.1 
question either as to joint venture or willful misconduct 
This Court has said on many occasions that al· 
though issues concerning joint venture or willful mis 
conduct are usually to be decided by a jury, where thr 
evidence is such that reasonable minds could not differ. 
the Court may rule on the issues as a matter of law. 
See Ricciuti vs. Robinson, 2 Ut.2d 45, 269 P.2d 28~. 
and Roylance vs. Davies, 18 Ut.2d 395, 424 P.2d W. 
POINT II. 
THE PRETRIAL JUDGE CORRECTLY 
RULED THAT THE PARTIES \VERE NOT 






















The defendant takes no issue with the authorities 
c1ed by the plaintiff in support of the proposition that 
111cmhers of a joint venture are not barred from suit 
;1gaiust one another for the individual negligence of 
u11e of the members. In reviewing plaintiff's authori-
ties, specific attention is called to plaintiffs reference 
to the llestatement of the Law, Torts 2d, Section 491 
! l'.) wherein it is stated: 
"The elements which are essential to a joint 
enterprise are commonly stated to be four: ( 1) 
An agreement, express or implied, among the 
members of the group; (2) a common purpose 
to be carried out by the group; ( 3) a community 
of pecuniary interest in that purpose, among the 
members; and ( 4) an equal right to a voice in 
the direction of the enterprise, which gives an 
equal right of control." (Emphasis ours.) 
The defendant respectfully submits that elements 
No. ( 3) and ( 4) referred to in the Restatement are 
absent in the instant case. In a most recent case, the 
Supreme Court of South Dakota considered this ques-
tion. See the case of Frederickson vs. Kleuver, 152 
.'.'flV.2d 346 (July 1967). In that case, two brothers 
drove to a city to attend a cattle sale, each separately 
mterested in inspecting the cattle for his own personal 
benefit. On the return trip home, one of the brothers 
driving the automobile became involved in an accident 
1,ilJ1 the plaintiff. The plaintiff attempted to join the 
other brother as a defendant, alleging a joint enterprise 
hv virtue of their attending a cattle sale. The Supreme 
CLurt of South Dakota stated in part: 
9 
"The elements necessary to constitute a j 011 !: 
enterprise arc seldom found iu purely socwl 
arrangements or matters of friendly accummiJ: .. 
tiou between friends, neighbors, aud relatn t, 
As pointe<l out in Prosser, La'v of Torts, Thir1i 
Edition, Page 490: 'It is generally agreed tli:11 
something more is required for a joint enteqm1l 
than the mere showing of a contract or agrtl 
ment to travel together to a destination for :: 
common purpose. Something in the nature 11i 
a common busines, financial or pecuniary intere.1: 
in the object of the journey is said to he esse11-
tial.' The essential elements are genera Uy l'.Oll 
sidered to be: ( 1) An agreement, express or irn- · 
plied, among the members of the group; ( :2; :1 : 
common purpose to be carried out by the grouv 
( 3) a community of pecuniary interest in that 
purpose among the members; and ( 4) an eqn:il : 
right to a voice in the direction and control ul 
the enterprise, which gives an equal right oi 
control." 
The Court thereafter ruled that the evidence in tlir 
, Frederickson case fell short of showing that the hrother1 · 
were involved in a joint enterprise on their cattle huy· 
iug trip. The Court said that since they went to tlie 
cattle sale to inspect cattle separately for their indi-
vidual benefit, not connected with any joint busi11c1' • 
arrangement, the elements of a common finaneial i1 1 
tcrest in the purpose of the trip was lacking. 
This Honorable Court stated in the recent c:11• ' 
of HalJ ,·s. Blackham, 18 Ut.2d 164, 417 P.2d tHP. :J· 
follows: 
"In the present case, the only purpose of the 
trip was duck hunting among friends, :: lrl[ 
10 
from which they were returning. In that sense, 
there was a common purpose, but no decision 
ever imputed the driver's negligence to the 
guests, just because they were all pleasure rid-
ing and meant to enjoy themselves together or 
separately at the journey's end." 
This Court further stated: 
"If we were to conclude as the plaintiffs re-
quest that there was a joint venture, the doctrine 
of joint enterprise would be applied to situa-
tions which are in fact only matters of friendly 
or social cooperation and accommodation where 
the reason for placing liability upon the parti-
cipants is not the same as if they were engaged 
in business or a commercial venture." 
Plaintiff, at page 9 of his brief, cites the case of 
Derrick vs. Salt Lake Railway Company, 50 Utah 
.mi, 168 Pacific 335. It is respectfully pointed out that 
iu the Derrick case, the parties involved in the accident 
were traveling salesmen on a business trip. The sole 
purpose of the trip was business. It was certainly not 
a trip of companionship, society and friendly accommo-
dation as we have in the instant case. Nowhere is it 
contended by the plaintiff that he and the defendant 
were traveling to California on a mutual business trip 
of any nature whatsoever. It is admitted by plaintiff 
that they were going to California as part of their 
itinerary of visiting various cities in the western states 
dming their summer ''acation and in conjunction there-
with defendant could visit with his brother. Under no 
strdeh of the imagination could such a purpose con-
11 
stitute a commercial of business relationship Leh\r·i· 
the parties. 
Plaintiff, at page 8 of his brief, cites the Reslalt 
ment of the Law, Torts 2d as to what the neeessan 
elements are to constitute a joint enterprise. One ~[ 
the elements is a community of pecuniary interest j11 , 
the purpose among the members. This element 11:11, 
totally lacking in the instant case as concluded by l111 
pretrial judge. The purpose of the trip between plaiu-
iiff and defendant was purely social. They were aecum 
panying each other on their vacation tour for socidy' 
and companionship. The plaintiff quotes the ease oi : 
l<'ox Y. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56 P.2d 1049, as sup-
port for his claim of joint venture. The quotation nt 
1 
page 11 of his brief clearly shows that a mere pleasure· 
ride between two individuals does not constitute a join•: 
venture. The case involved the owner of the whicl1 
who was riding in the vehicle at the time of the accident.. 
~nj uring a third person, which is unlike the facts i1: ' 
the instant case. 
At pag~ 12 of plaintiff's brief, he states: 
"The parties testified as to their agreem~nt: : 
their community of purpose; their equal r1ghl : 
to control and their agreement to share equalh ' 
in the expenses of the trip." : 
i 
Defendant respectfully points out that no reference ! 
to any part of the record or to the depositions of thr I 
parties have beeu referred to by the plaintiff in support 
of such a statement. The fact of the matter is the tcsli· 
12 
n;ony of the plaintiff an<l the defendant was to the 
effect that the plaintiff inquired of the owner of the 
automobile if it would be permissible to allow the de-
fendant to assist him in the driving of the vehicle. 
1Ptf. Dep. p. 15) The mere fact that the defendant 
mis to assist in payment of some of the expenses in the 
operation of the automobile on their sight-seeing trip 
\u California is not sufficient to constitute a joint 
renture. See Greenhalgh v. Green, 16 Ut.2d 221, 398 
P.:2d u91; Smith v. Franklin, 14 Ut.2d 16, 376 P.2d 
,jH; and Hall v. Blackham, (supra). 
Plaintiff argues at page 11 of his brief that each 
of the parties had a vested interest in the automobile 
and an equal voice and right to be heard respecting the 
rletails of the journey. Again, his statement is made 
without support of the record in any manner. Nor 
does the plaintiff plead that there was an agency or 
joint venture between the parties, but specifically al-
leges in his Amended Complaint that the defendant was 
the agent of the owner of the vehicle in driving the 
rehicle. The defendant withdrew and abandoned any 
1 
claim of agency or joint venture without objection 
from the plaintiff, and with approval of the Court. 
The plaintiff represented to the pretrial judge that 
liis claim against the defendant was based upon two 
separate grounds. One, that there was a joint venture 
between the parties; and, two, in the event of a failure 
to prove joint venture, the defendant was guilty of 
willful misconduct. (Trans. p. 34 and 46) Based upon 
13 
ihese allegations and the facts contained withill tl ... 
record, coupled with statements of counsel, the Coll! 
det;:rminctl as n matter of law that plaintiff was ilr:i 
cntitied to rccoyer. The Court correctly ruled that liil 
agreement Letween the parties to nrnke a pleasure tr;1, 
to Califor:1ia with a sharing of the automobile expense1 
did uot constitute a joint venture. ' 
POINT III. 
THE PRETRIAL JUDGE. \VAS NOT PRE-' 
CLUDED .FROlH CONSIDERING THE M0-1 
TION FOR DIS.MISSAL A'i' THE TIME OF! 
I 
PRETRIAL. I 
At page 13 of plaintiff's brief, he quotes from ll11 ! 
decision of Judge Keller concerning the first moii11:. · 
for summary judgment by the defendant Aaron where-
in the Court denie<l the motion because of the ul/t!Jfl 
!ion's of defendant Aaron's Answer that he and ilu. 
plaintiff were engaged in a joint or common entcrp1·i· l 
al the time of the plaintiff's alleged injuries. (ltalie1 i 
ours.) 
Defei~dant has no argume11t with the staternet1i 1 
cf ihe Court, based upon the facts presented to the I 
Court at tha~ ti1ne. I-Imn'\-er, it is respectfully pointed I 
out that foe motion was made at the commencernenl ; 
of the suit ~md prior to the taking of the depositi11111 I 
of the parties. Thereafter, the defenrlant Aaron more'.1 .. 
the Court for pnmission to abaDdon the defense iii 
14 
joint enterprise without objection from the plaintiff, 
and the Court granted said motion. 
Plaintiff also fails to include in his brief that the 
motion was based upon matters not now before the 
Court, as the original motion for summary judgment 
, made by defendant Aarfon was based upon the written 
contract introduced into evidence at the commencement 
of the suit, and plaintiff's original Complaint. It is 
respectfully submitted that a trial court may at any 
stage of the proceedings entertain a motion to dismiss 
a suit where the Court feels the motion is well taken. 
1 Plaintiff maintains that if a motion to dismiss or for 
1 
summary judgment is denied at the commencement 
of litigation that the parties are thereafter forever 
barred from obtaining a dismissal of the action by 
motion. Such a contention is obviously incorrect on 
its face. The Court has the inhe;rent power to dismiss 
nn action at any time the Court deems that such action 
is without merit and the issues are still before the Court. 
I I POINT IV 
I 
' THERE 'VAS NO ISSUE OF FACT AS TO 
, ! WILLFUL :MISCONDUCT ON THE PART 
l' 
'I OF THE DEFENDANT. 
The plaintiff testified throughout his deposition 
that the <lefendant did not drive at an excessive rate 
of speed, that he obeyed all of the traffic rules and 
cl . regulations, and that he did not partake of intoxicat-






pletely satisEe<l with the manner in which the defenJa:
1
: 
was operating the automobile. Under such a statt· "
1 
fac~s, the Court properly ruled that the mere fad th:i . 
the defendant failed to negotiate a turn on the high\1;:.i 
under the facts as presented by the plaintiff wa~ not 
sufficient evidence to justify submitting to auy jury. 
an issue of willful misconduct. This Court's attentio11 
is respectfully called to the case of Ricciuti Ys. HoL- 1 
iuson (supra.) ·wherein the Court fully sets forth tlie 
conduct of a driver to be considered in relation io ;1 
charge of willful misconduct. The opinion further . 
states that willful misconduct is not shown by allega : 
tions of ordinary negligence. See also ~lilligau \) 
1 
Harward, 11 Ut.2d 74<, 355 P.2d 62, and Roylance r~. 
Davies, (supra.) I 
CONCLUSION 
It must be kept in mind that the testimony of the I 
plaintiff an<l the defendant would constitute the sum ; 
nnd substance of the evidence that could be produced ' 
at the time of trial as to the relationship of the partie~ i 
and the conduct of each leading to the accident. It ii I 
respectful1y submitted that neither the plaintiff nor the i 
defendant testified to any state of facts sufficient 111 : 
constitute a joint venture. The plaintiff's evidence ii r 
completely lacking in facts showing a business or corn- ! 
mercial venture involving a pecuniary interest to thr I 
parties sufficient to bring the case within the rules :l' ' 
set forth in the Restatement of the Law of Torts 211 
16 
Section 491, which he adopts in his brief. The nece:ssary 
clements of a joint venture cannot be found in plain-
tiff's evidence. 
The mere fact that defendant failed to negotiate 
ihe curve in question does not constitute willful mis-
rnmluct. It is respectfully submitted that the facls a:s 
presented by the plaintiff and construed most favor-
able to him show nothing more than two college students 
oil a summer vacation sight-seeing trip to California 
and to \·isit with defendant's brother. In accomplishing 
1 ' tl1is purpose, the parties agreed to share the automobile 
· : l'Xpenses and the task of driving a borrowed automo-
, ' bile. Plaintiff alleges in one breath that the defendant 
' ' was guilty of willful misconduct in the operation of 
the automobile, but in the next breath, states that he 
was completely satisfied with the manner in which the 
Yehicle was being operated. The inconsistency of plain-
1 tiff"s position appears obvious. 
ti It is respectfuly submitted that the ruling of the 
11 
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